Mass deportations of Armenian minorities from their historical homelands in the Ottoman Empire during the WWI and the Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923 were the two major events of the early 20th century that permanently changed the ethno-religious landscape of Anatolia. These events marked the end of centuries-long coexistence of the Muslim populations with the two biggest non-Muslim communities in Anatolia. In this paper, we empirically investigate the legacy of the Armenian and Greek populations during the late Ottoman period on regional development in modern Turkey. In particular, we explore, at the sub-national level, the relationship between the historical Armenian and Greek presence, and several indicators of development including population density, urbanization and regional income. Findings suggest that locations with greater presence of Greek and Armenian minorities at the end of the 19th century are systematically more densely populated, more urbanized and exhibit greater economic activity today. We offer suggestive evidence on two potential channels.
Introduction
How can we evaluate the role of different ethno-religious groups in economic development? This paper aims to answer this question by focusing on the Armenian and Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire, whose members were expelled from their homelands in Anatolia en masse in the early 20th century. The forceful displacement of Armenians from their homelands and livelihoods following the onset of the First World War and the expulsion of Greek minorities after the Greco-Turkish War (1919 -1922 virtually put an end to hundreds of years of cohabitation and socioeconomic interactions between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
The goal of this paper is to assess the long-run contribution of Armenians and Greeks to regional development in Anatolia by exploring empirically the legacy these groups left in modern Turkey. Historically, Armenian and Greek communities possessed higher levels of physical capital, had higher levels of education, and were disproportionately more represented in modern economic sectors (????). Hence, they plausibly had a bigger impact on the development of their home regions than the Muslim subjects of the Empire. We investigate the persistence of this potential Armenian and Greek legacy. More specifically, we seek to answer the following question: Would the economic contribution of these minorities simply die out over time when the human capital embodied in their members is no longer an input to regional production? In other words, can we observe, even in today's outcomes, the influence of the physical capital these groups have accumulated until their departure or of the knowledge diffusion that possibly took place over the long period of coexistence with the Muslim majority? To offer an answer to this question, this study attempts to isolate the part of regional disparities in economic development today that resulted from the historical foundations laid by ethno-religious groups that are long gone.
By exploiting the sub-national variation in the size of Armenian and Greek communities and various proxies for economic development, we explore the relationship between historical nonMuslim minority presence and observable indicators of current regional development. We find that districts with greater Armenian and Greek concentration before the expulsions are today more densely populated, more urbanized and enjoy higher economic welfare as measured by the intensity of lights at night, a widely used proxy for economic activity when more direct indicators of development are not available at the local level. Our results are robust to the inclusion of various potential drivers of historical development and remain qualitatively intact under our instrumental variables analysis. Previous works by historians on the legacy of the Armenian and Greek populations of Anatolia have a qualitative nature and mostly focus on particular localities that were affected by the expulsions. To our knowledge, this paper is the first study documenting empirically the positive relationship between regional concentration of Ottoman Greeks and Armenians in Anatolia and subsequent Turkish development.
Various channels could be responsible for this legacy. Part of it could be directly attributed to inter-group differences in the accumulation of human capital and positive spill-overs of knowledge and entrepreneurial skills. Another channel could be the contribution of the productive assets, originally owned by non-Muslim minorities, to future economic development at the regional level.
Historical accounts suggest that the minority capital that was transferred to the local elite might have played an important role during the emergence of a Muslim bourgeoisie and provided a foundation for the creation of a modern national economy (??). We offer some evidence suggesting that the legacy of Armenians and Greeks on economic development might have operated both through their indirect contribution on human capital accumulation among Muslims and the transfer of productive assets to the Muslim population in the aftermath of the expulsions.
Any empirical evaluation of the persistence of the contribution of minorities in regional development is subject to several problems. Focusing on post-emigration outcomes in the source country may not be sufficient, because most migration happens voluntarily. The dynamics of a migration wave depend on the preferences, skills and economic opportunities (e.g. ethnic networks) of individual emigrants, and the resulting selection effects pose two main obstacles. First of all, the fact that some group members typically choose to stay implies that there is no marked end to a minority group's presence in all regions under study. This makes it impossible to disentangle the legacy of previous generations ofémigrés from the effect of the remaining co-ethnics. Secondly, since the timings of voluntary migrations typically differ by region, so does the durations of treatment, i.e. the absence of group members in each region. Therefore, it is not possible to address the question of persistence using a single year to measure the outcomes in each region.
The historical setting we focus on makes our analysis largely immune to the aforementioned problems. Both Greeks and Armenians were forced to leave their homelands in Anatolia as a result of the official state policies which were partly motivated by the ongoing wars and partly by the ideological orientations of the ruling elite of the time. The mass expulsions of Armenians and Greeks took place around the same time period and they led to a virtually complete removal of these communities from all the regions of Anatolia in a matter of a couple of years (1915 ( -1917 ( for Armenians and 1919 ( -1923 for Greeks). Around 1893, Armenians and Greeks constituted about 8 and 10 percent of the Ottoman population in the territories that roughly correspond to Turkey today (?). By 1927, however, more than 97 percent of Turkey's population was Muslim. 1 Hence, using the fact that none of the regions in our sample was spared from the expulsions, we are able to exploit sub-national variation in the presence of Armenian and Greek people of the late Ottoman period as a proxy for the long-run exposure of each region to minorities. This in turn allows us to explore the link between such exposure and various modern indicators of economic performance.
The mass killings and deportations of the Ottoman Armenians took place during [1915] [1916] [1917] following the 'Temporary Law of Deportation' (Tehcir Law) issued by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government. The number of Armenians who lost their lives during and following the deportations and the number of survivors in exile are subject to big controversies. While some historians put the number near to 850,000 (?), some other studies like ? argue that the Ottoman Armenian casualties should be close to 1.2 million. The survivors lived in exile for the rest of their lives with the exception of a relatively small number who were exempt from the deportations or 1 When Istanbul is excluded, this figure is as high as 99 percent. managed to survive, taking refuge with Muslim families, hiding their identities or converting to Islam to escape the deportations.
The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange (the Asia Minor Catastrophe as it was commonly called in Greece) took place in 1923 after the two states signed the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. Including the Greek emigrants who fled, prior to the exchange agreement, from the destruction of the Greco-Turkish War, the mass migrations involved around 1.3 million Anatolian Greeks who were expelled from Anatolia and moved to Greece, and 354,000 Muslims who were expelled from Greece and resettled to Turkey (?).
These events are quite unique both in terms of the number of people involved and in the sense that only a negligible number of the expelled Armenians and Greeks returned -or managed to return-to Turkey. 2 Among those who survived, many chose to leave over the first couple of decades following the foundation of the Turkish Republic. What these unfortunate circumstances imply is that, unlike many other migration events, in our setting, return migration is not an issue that we need to account for in our empirical analysis.
Armenian and Greek expulsions not only brought death and suffering at catastrophic scales, but also caused much damage to the social and economic fabric of modern Turkey. Although anecdotal evidence and some macro-level statistics on the state of the economy in the aftermath of the war years abound, 3 it is difficult to separate the individual role of expulsions from the destructive forces of constant warship. Quantitative studies of Turkish economic development and regional income disparities such as ? and ? have largely ignored the long-term consequences of the expulsions, primarily because of the lack of reliable and comparable regional data on relevant outcomes before and after the expulsions. It is important to note that this paper does not aim to evaluate the direct impact of the expulsions either, and our findings should not be interpreted as such. Instead, the positive correlations we document between past minority presence and contemporary development should be viewed as a suggestive evidence on the persistent Armenian and Greek legacy. Yet, we believe that our findings are, at least qualitatively, informative about the counterfactual trajectory Turkish economy might have followed if the expulsions had not happened.
First and foremost, this paper contributes to the literature on the expulsion of minorities.
For instance, Waldinger's recent work investigates the effect of the expulsion of Jewish academics on German universities focusing on inter-ethnic spillovers (?). Relatedly, ? provide evidence on how the persecution, displacement and mass murder of Jews by the Nazis in the WW2 left a persistent impact on the social fabric and education of Russian cities. They show that cities where the Holocaust was more severe have worse economic and political outcomes than other cities. Our approach differs from theirs in that we do not view the deportations of minorities from the Ottoman 2 One reason was the government law issued in May 1927 which authorized the exclusion of Turkish nationality to anyone who had not taken part in the War of Independence and had remained abroad between 24 July 1923 and 27 May 1927. 3 According to the estimates reported in ?, economic activity in many sectors slowed down substantially. The percentage declines were about 75 percent in coal production, 50 percent for draught animals, 40 percent for sheep and goats, 40 percent in wheat production, 50 percent in the tobacco, raisins, hazelnuts, olive oil, raw silk and cotton business, 80 percent in minerals and 50 percent in cotton textiles. Overall, GDP shrunk roughly by 40 percent.
Empire as a one-time historical shock whose direct short-term effect we would like to estimate. We conjecture that in the short-run there were negative repercussions. However, these adverse shocks are merely events that put an end to a centuries-long co-existence, and this long-term co-existence should have aggregate positive spillovers onto the rest of the population that last even after the originators are gone. Hence, our results should be interpreted as the accumulated legacy of coexistence with non-Muslim minorities. Additionally, ? focus on the Pale of Settlement area where Jews were allowed to live in the Russian Empire, and show that current residents of the Pale of Settlement exhibit higher anti-market attitudes, lower entrepreneurship and higher trust. In a similar spirit, we investigate what kind of legacy the historical minority presence left for the predominantly Muslim population that remained.
Furthermore, this study adds to the literature on the socioeconomic and political legacy of minorities. For example, ? shows that, in parts of South Eastern Europe occupied by the Ottoman Empire, localities with more historical Armenian, Greek or Jewish minorities have higher levels of bank penetration today. ? also points out the overwhelming role of minorities in trade and commerce in the Ottoman Empire. The literature on minorities largely emphasized the role of human capital in development (?), and, in particular, the role of the human capital possessed by ethno-religious minorities with occupational specialization, higher education and knowhow (?). In this strand, ? provide evidence that Prussian counties with a higher concentration of Protestants were more prosperous in the late 19th century, and they show this effect to be driven by Luther's promotion of education. ? studies the long-term effects of skilled-worker immigration on productivity focusing on Huguenots' migration to Prussia. He identifies causal effects of Huguenot settlement on the productivity of textile manufactories hundred years after their immigration. In our setting, one question of interest is whether part of the legacy of the non-Muslim minorities on current outcomes reflects human capital spillovers (know-how, expertise, entrepreneurial spirit, etc.) onto the Muslim population during the long co-existence of the two communities. If such spill-overs exist, one would expect their effect to be more salient during the course of the creation of a national economy that relies on the Muslim workforce, entrepreneurs, and farmers working on the productive assets and land left behind by the minorities, and in sectors, markets and occupations previously controlled by minorities. Therefore, the long co-existence of Muslims and non-Muslim minorities should have productive spillovers even after the minorities were gone, and this should positively affect the subsequent development of those localities with larger historical minority population.
Given its focus on the Ottoman Armenians, Sakalli (2014, mimeo) is a recent study that is also closely related to our paper. It advances the hypothesis that those locations with higher share of Armenians exhibited greater religious polarization which in turn strengthened the attachment of local Muslims to their religion. The paper provides evidence suggesting that this effect of the Muslim-Armenian coexistence in Anatolia on religiosity persisted well into the late 20th century, and this cultural legacy eventually manifested itself in lower rates of literacy and primary school completion after to the secularization of education in the early Turkish Republic. This paper also speaks to a broad strand of literature on the persistent effects of historical events. In this literature, researchers have studied, for example, the economic and institutional consequences of the outbreak of the Black Death in Europe in the 1340s (???), the effects of the 1840s Irish famine on emigration and industrialization (???), the effects of the loss of life and economic damage caused by wars (??), and the persistent effects of slavery and slave trade on sub-Saharan Africa (???).
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on regional development in Turkey and the income disparities between eastern and western parts of Turkey (?????).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides information about the economic position of Greeks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the legal status of nonMuslim minorities, and offers a brief historical summary of the events leading up to deportations of the Armenians and the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange. Section 3 describes our data and the empirical methodology we employ. In Section 4 we present our empirical findings and offer some evidence on potential channels, and section 5 concludes the paper.
Historical Background

Minorities in the Ottoman Empire
From its foundation circa 1299 until its dissolution in 1922, the Ottoman Empire ranged from Asia Minor to the Balkans, to Maghreb and to the Arabic peninsula; and it ruled over ethnically and religiously heterogeneous peoples. As the Empire expanded and incorporated a greater number of diverse peoples, there emerged a need to institutionalize various groups into the empire in order to maintain peace and harmony.
After the conquest of Constantinople, which has historically been the center of the Orthodox Christian world, Sultan Mehmet II laid the foundation of the millet (community or nation) system. Under the millet system, non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy and were allowed to rule themselves. Each minority group was organized into a separate millet and was free to elect its own religious leader. For example, Armenian Orthodox and Greek Orthodox millets were separate communities presided by their own Patriarchs. Shariah (the Islamic law) had no jurisdiction over non-Muslim minorities, on issues of business conduct for example, and any case among non-Muslims was tried according to their own law. In addition to legal autonomy, millets had the right to use their own language, control their own schools and churches, and collect taxes (??). Lastly, non-Muslims were not required to serve in the military by paying poll taxes, which might have worked in their advantage by allowing them to focus on their business.
Benefiting from their privileged legal and institutional position, non-Muslim minorities of the Empire thrived economically, and by the 19th century they had a disproportionate control over trade, commerce and finance (?). Thus, compared to its Muslim subjects, Armenians and Greeks of the Ottoman Empire were at a relatively more advanced stage in their economic modernization.
They were, on average, more educated, were engaged in higher value-added sectors in trade, agriculture and manufacturing, and owned greater wealth relative to their Muslim counterparts (???).
For instance, in the Black Sea region Armenian and Greek merchants dominated the brokerage between Western and local traders as well as the procurement and the distribution of goods. By the end of the 19th century, in the province of Trabzon, out of 33 exporters, three were Turks, one was Swiss, and the remaining 29 were Greek or Armenian, while out of 63 major importers, only 10 were Turkish (?). 4 Also along the Aegean coast non-Muslims, especially Greeks, dominated commerce. Greeks constituted 40 to 60 percent of the merchants, although they formed 20 to 38 percent of the total population (?). Similarly, in Istanbul, a predominantly Turkish city, Turks made up just 4 percent of export-import merchants by the time of First World War. Official statistics also confirm these numbers. According to the Ottoman yearbook of 1912, Muslims of the empire, 81 percent of the total population, not only had no role in trade with Europe, but also had a limited role in local trade. They made up 15 percent of local traders, while Armenians and Greeks made up 23 and 43 percent of local traders, respectively (?). A survivor's report after the WW1 suggests that even in Erzurum, which today is a poor eastern province in Anatolia, Armenians were dominant in the economic realm. According to the report, 80 percent of local commerce in the vilayet of Erzurum was due to Armenians. They owned about 60 commercial firms with an annual turnover of more than 30,000 Turkish pounds, 500 firms with a turnover between 10,000 and 15,000 Turkish pounds and 2,500 firms with a turnover between 800 and 1,000 Turkish pounds.
They controlled most of the trade with other provinces and almost all foreign trade of the vilayet (?).
Expulsion of Minorities from the Empire
The Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), mostly Muslim students, staged a coup and seized power from the Sultan Abdulhamid in 1908. Although CUP's initial reform-oriented agenda was to reinstitute a constitutional and parliamentary framework, it quickly set on a national homogenization path in the heat of external and internal tensions as the Empire disintegrated. As the census counts were known to be incomplete mostly due to the practical difficulty of counting various nomadic tribes. Although the Ottoman statistical office reported the names of the specific vilayets, sancaks, and tribes for which counts were incomplete and provide population estimates for these areas, these estimates are unlikely to be reliable and they are not available at the district level. Rather than making arbitrary assumptions about how the estimated uncounted population was distributed across Ottoman districts within a given sancak/vilayet, we drop all modern districts 6 The picture is further complicated due to the fact that between 1854 and 1908 approximately 5 million Muslims immigrated from Russia (Caucasus, Crimea, Kuban, and Central Asia) and the Balkans to the Ottoman lands, while over the same period about 500,000 to 800,000 Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs emigrated, mainly to Russia and the Americas. Since the the immigrants were only reflected in the Ottoman statistics with a substantial time lag whereas the minorities who left were accounted for in a more timely fashion, in the regions where Muslim immigrants settled the Census statistics are more likely to understate the actual share of Muslims.
7 ? argues that the official Ottoman Census records should be deemed as the most reliable source of information about the Ottoman population. One reason is that these censuses were primarily designed to meet administrative and military needs, especially the need to acquire accurate information about the number of and age of the male population for the purposes of recruitment into a modern army. Karpat discusses in length some of the discrepancies and potential biases in the alternative sources of information. While it might be too far stretched to claim that the official censuses of the late Ottoman period present a completely unbiased picture of the non-Muslim presence in the Empire, there is no apparent reason to suspect that any bias in population figures for the minorities varied by region in a systematic way. The 1913-1915 population figures released by the Armenian Patriarchate put the total number of Armenians in the empire to well above the official Ottoman figures, the reliability of these figures were also questioned. Even if these figures were closer to the true numbers, they suffer from the same problem that make the 1914 Ottoman statistics unsuitable. More importantly, the statistics of the Patriarchate are confined to the Armenian community and hence they do not provide any information on the population of Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities.
8 The Ottoman censuses were far from perfect. In some vilayets there was serious undercounting of women and children. In some regions, females were even totally excluded from the census count. ? applies some corrections to the Census figures using Model Life Tables and reports the resulting lower-and upper-bound estimates. However, these estimates are only available at the level of Ottoman vilayets, making them less useful for a disaggregated analysis. Since these regions (Bagdat, Basra, and Musul Provinces and Ipek and Prizren Sancaks) remain outside the modern Turkish boundaries, missing female figures do not pose a problem for our analysis.
that were mapped to Ottoman locations with incomplete Census counts. Since historical population data for areas that were under Russian occupation at the time of the census counts were not available, the Turkish provinces and districts that fall within these occupied territories are also excluded from the sample.
Mapping Ottoman kazas listed in the 1893 Census into modern Turkish administrative divisions is a challenging task. Although historical maps showing the borders of vilayets and sancaks are available, information about geographic boundaries for kazas is absent. This makes it impossible to employ spatial mapping techniques. Instead, we match Ottoman kazas with Turkish districts by name based on the Ottoman location names listed in ?. This source documents how the administrative status and classification of each location evolved from the early Ottoman period until we reach the current administrative units of the Turkish Republic. This information allows us to search for the name of modern districts (ilçe) and identify which Ottoman kaza they used to belong to at the time the 1893 Census was conducted. 9 In most of the cases, an Ottoman kaza is either matched with a single or often times to multiple modern districts, as the former is usually geographically larger than the latter. 10 Our unit of observation is a modern district. The population shares reported for each modern district on the map reflect the historical shares of Armenians and Greeks in the Ottoman kaza to which the modern district was assigned.
The two maps not only document the cross-district and cross-regional variation in minority shares, but they also demonstrate the distinct patterns of settlement of the two groups. Armenians were heavily concentrated in their historic homelands in the eastern half of Anatolia, also called as the Western Armenia. Greeks, on the other hand, were more concentrated in the coastal regions in the west, the Thrace region in the northwestern end of Turkey and eastern part of the Black Sea coast.
Data on Outcome Measures
Turkish Population Censuses The first set of outcome measures are the levels of population and urbanization rates at the district level from the Turkish census of 2000. Urbanization rate is the share of district population living within the municipal boundaries that define the district centers.
The 2000 Census allows us to investigate the persistent traces of the centuries long presence of Greek 9 For some modern districts, especially those that are established during the Turkish Republic in areas where there was no settlement during the Ottoman period, it was not possible to identify the kaza or sancak that contains these areas. For these districts, we relied on other sources (mainly web sites of the local state administrations and municipalities) offering information about the history of the district, including where in the Ottoman administrative hierarchy it used to belong. A couple of cases for which no reliable information can be obtained is left out of the sample 10 After the one-way mapping process of modern districts into Ottoman kazas is complete, there were a few remaining kazas that were not assigned to any modern district. Searching through the Ottoman location names in ? we were able to identify which modern district they overlapped with or contained by. These exceptional cases involve a large modern district whose territory coincides with -or contain-multiple kazas. In all regressions, we omit from the sample the Istanbul province, the capital of the Ottoman Empire since 1453 and by far the most populous province in modern Turkey. The first reason is that Istanbul is by far the most important historic center of economic activity and home to much larger Greek and Armenian communities than what would be representative of the other regions of the Ottoman Empire. While the role of minorities in the development of these major hubs of economic activity cannot be ignored, the socioeconomic disparity between Istanbul and the rest of Turkey make the former highly influential in our empirical analysis. 11 The second reason is that the residents of Istanbul were exempt from the population exchange between Greece and Turkey as well as the deportation of Armenians.
Satellite Light Density at Night The subnational nature of our empirical study requires detailed spatial data on economic development. Existing measures of regional income for Turkey is only available at the level of province. In contrast, using satellite light density at night (or luminosity) as a proxy for local economic activity, we are able to exploit variation across more than 700 districts. 12 The luminosity data is obtained from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program's (DMSP) Operational Linescan System which reports images of the earth at night captured from 20:30 to 22:00 local time. The satellites detect lights from human settlements, fires, gas flares, lightning, and the aurora. Light density measure is a six-bit number (ranging from 0 to 63) calculated for every 30-second area (approximately 1 square kilometer). Overlaying all images captured during a calendar year, dropping images where lights are shrouded by cloud or overpowered by the aurora or solar glare (near the poles), and removing ephemeral lights like fires and lightning, an annual composite image of time-stable lights are created. 13 We construct a measure of average light density in 2000 at the district level, averaging across pixels that fall within district boundaries. The use of satellite light density as a proxy of economic development builds upon previous studies, of which some prominent examples are ?, ?, ?, ? and ?. These studies document a strong within-country correlation between luminosity and GDP levels and growth rates.
13 Luminosity data are subject to saturation and blooming. Saturation occurs at a level of light density that is observed in rich urban centers. The corresponding pixels are top-coded with the maximum value of 63 assigned to each of them. Blooming occurs when the light intensity in some areas are perceived by satellites to be stronger than they actually are. This problem is more common for light sources near water and snowy areas.
Data on Control Variables
To account for potential exogenous factors that might have driven early Armenian and Greek settlement in economically more viable regions of Anatolia, we employ several geographical attributes as control variables. Using the ArcGIS software for spatial data manipulation and analysis, and digital maps, we construct several measures that might drive regional development. These control variables include latitude, longitude, and various other geographical attributes; namely adjacency to sea, lakes, major rivers, average elevation, ruggedness (measured as the standard deviation of elevation) and distance to nearest modern national border. In all regressions we also control for the total historical population of the Ottoman kaza or sancak in 1893. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all the variables we use in our empirical analysis. 
Empirical Framework
Our goal is to assess the relationship between the historical presence of Armenian and Greeks on the one hand and the contemporary outcomes on the other. Key to our identification is the fact that the deportation of Armenians in 1915-1916 and the Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923 forced almost all the Armenian and Greek people of Anatolia to leave their centuries-long homelands over a very short time period and to settle in places outside Turkey. Given this fact, we use the size of Armenian and Greek populations prior to these dramatic events as a proxy for the long-term exposure of each district to minority presence.
We use two alternative measurements of minority presence. The first measure is the population size of Armenians and Greeks. The second is their share in the population. Which measure is more relevant presumably depends on the type of outcome we are interested in and what kind of a channel we have in mind when we think about the contribution of a centuries long Armenian and Greek presence to a region which no longer is home to these groups. For instance, the absolute scale (rather than merely the relative size) of the Armenian and Greek communities might have had an independent effect on development if, for example, there are economies of scale in the accumulation of cultural capital or formation of ethnic networks that contribute to productivity.
Also the productivity of religious minorities may be subject to threshold effects. On the other hand, if human capital spillovers between different ethno-religious groups are important, the opportunities and incentives for social and economic interactions across religious groups may matter for long-run productivity. A large Armenian minority that constitute a small fraction of a sizeable population in a region may have a different interaction with other groups, than a smaller Armenian group that constitutes a significant portion of the local population. Hence, depending on the context, the ethno-religious composition of a region may be more important for the outcomes we consider than the sheer size of the minorities. We start with an investigation of the role of minority population size and then move to regressions where the variable of interest is minority share. We first estimate the following equation using OLS
y i is the modern outcome of interest (population density, urbanization or light density in 2000) for a modern district i. The independent variable of interest is the historical Armenian presence armpop 1893 in the Ottoman kaza (or sancak) k i to which district i was assigned. Total population size totpop 1893 in k i is included in the model not only as a scaling factor, but also to account for any direct legacy of the historical size of the kaza/sancak on contemporary outcomes.
It can also be viewed as a proxy for initial economic conditions. Both population measures have a highly skewed distribution. Therefore, we use their logarithmic transformations. Since in several instances, multiple districts are assigned to a given Ottoman administrative unit, the 1893 figures for the Armenian population captures the exposure of district i to historical Armenian presence in kaza/sancak k i as well as the exposure all other modern districts (if any) that are mapped to k i , i.e., all j with k j = k i . In that sense, the coefficient of interest α 1 reflects the kaza/sancak level fixed effect of Armenians on modern district outcomes. Finally, X i denotes the vector of geographical attributes we include in our baseline estimating equation.
The second model is simply a replication of the first model using the size of Greek minorities instead of the Armenian population, while the third baseline model includes both variables (Armenian and Greek populations) simultaneously.
(2)
4 Empirical Results
Minorities and Contemporary Population Density
Our first outcome measure is the population density of a district in 2000. We view population density as an indicator reflecting the degree of economic opportunities and the capacity to sustain higher concentrations of people. Albeit a highly noisy proxy for development, population density is a good starting point in our attempt to understand the potential legacy of minorities on current demographic patterns. that include historical population variables and a set of dummies for each of the seven geographic regions of Turkey. 14 In the second column, we add latitude and longitude and continue expanding the model with the remaining set of geographical controls until we reach column 5. In the last column we replace the modern region dummies with 21 geographic subregion dummies to obtain our baseline model. In all regressions, reported standard errors are clustered at the level of the smallest administrative unit for which we have data on minority populations. In almost the entire sample, this unit has a kaza status, and in a small number of cases the clustering unit has a sancak status (e.g. Genc Sancak in Bitlis Province). 15 Unless stated otherwise, we report the changes in outcomes variables that correspond to increasing our variable of interest from 10th to the 90th percentile of its cross-district distribution in the sample.
Moving to results in panel A, Armenian population in 1893 appears as a positive and statistically significant correlate of district population density in 2000 in all specifications. Specifically, the estimated coefficient from the baseline model in the last column suggests that a move in the size of the Armenian population from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its cross-regional distribution 16
is associated with an increase in population density by almost 43 percent, a relationship that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
14 These regions are the Marmara, Mediterranean, Aegean, Black Sea, Middle Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia. They are not administrative regions. When defining them geographers considered similarity of provinces with respect to geographical factors such as climate, vegetation, presence of mountain ranges, and also some economic factors such as demographics, transportation and type of products cultivated.
15 Since most of the time Ottoman kazas are assigned to multiple modern districts, our choice of clustering unit allows for arbitrary correlation of disturbance terms across districts that are assigned to the same kaza.
16 This move corresponds to raising the size of the Armenian population in an Ottoman kaza from zero to about 10,700. The average kaza had around 4,086 Armenian inhabitants. the population density is estimated to increase by about 38 percent from its sample mean. The relationship is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
When both the Armenian and Greek population size are entered simultaneously Armenian population appears significant at the 1 percent level, albeit the predicted change in population density is somewhat smaller (35 percent at the mean). 18 The coefficient on Greek population size remains positive but insignificant at conventional levels with a p-value of 0.11.
The fact that the estimated coefficients of interest are stable and there are no sizable differences across different columns is reassuring in the sense that selection on geographical attributes do not seem to be a major problem in our context. Clearly, the results should be interpreted with caution as they do not imply causation as we cannot rule out the possibility that selection of Armenian and Greek minorities occurred in the distant past on some unobservable factors that make some regions economically more lucrative than others.
Minorities and Contemporary Urbanization Rates
Our second outcome measure is urbanization rate in a district in 2000. It shows the fraction of district population living within the borders that define district centers. One can view this measure as containing more specific information about the degree of economic modernization. Historically, Greeks and Armenians were more urbanized than the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
If due to their occupational specializations these groups were attracted to more urbanized central districts in the Ottoman territory, one would expect this selection effect to manifest itself as higher urbanization today, despite the fact that these minorities no longer live in these locations. However, persistence of initial conditions does not preclude the possibility that regional disparity in these conditions might be the outcome of long-term presence of Greek and Armenian communities and their contribution to economic development. Many provinces and districts that are significantly more urbanized today were possibly not so much ahead of other regions at some distant past, prior to the settlement of first Greek and Armenian groups. Therefore, the evidence in Table 3 can be interpreted in two different ways, and which interpretation plays a more significant role is hard to tell without controlling for the selection story.
Moving to results, we see that districts with higher historical exposure to Armenian presence are significantly more urbanized even after controlling for the baseline geographical variables. The coefficient estimates from the baseline models in column 6 of panel A and C suggest that, keeping other variables constant, a move from 10th to the 90th percentile of the regional distribution of Armenian population is associated with an increase in urbanization rate by about 8 to 9 percentage points, a change that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
17 This move corresponds to raising the size of the Greek population in an Ottoman kaza from zero to about 21,300. The average kaza had around 6,850 Greek inhabitants.
18 It is important to highlight that the estimates in the baseline model reflect the average partial correlations that are driven by variations within 21 subregions. The evidence on Greeks is qualitatively similar, but less robust. The positive association between Greek population size and urbanization rate in panel B -with an estimated change of 6.7
percentage point in urbanization rate under the baseline model-is significant at the 5 percent level, but it does not survive when we include the size of the Armenian population (panel C).
Minorities and Contemporary Economic Development as Measured by Luminosity
4.3.1
Historical Minority Population Size and Regional Development
Our third and main outcome variable is luminosity, i.e., average light intensity measured from satellite images at night. While certainly a noisy measure that does not capture economic prosperity in its entirety, it nonetheless is a good proxy for economic development, albeit, mostly driven by industrial activity, urbanization and urban infrastructure than by agricultural activity. In light of previous results on population density and urbanization, one would expect to see also a positive relationship between minority presence and luminosity. The evidence in Table 4 Average luminosity is higher by 45 percent (at the mean) when we move from 10th to the 90th percentile of the Greek population distribution. In units of regional GDP, again, this chance roughly corresponds to an increase in income per capita by $535.
Historical Minority Shares and Regional Development
In Table 5 we use minority population shares as an alternative to absolute population size. The estimated models are otherwise identical to those in Table 4 . We do not view the results presented The baseline results suggest that a move from 10th to the 90th percentile of the crossregional distribution of Armenian population share is associated with an increase in mean luminosity by 19 to 20 percent (panel A and panel C), while the corresponding change in luminosity for Greeks stands around 31 percent (panel B and panel C). Unlike the minority size regressions presented in the previous section, where the coefficient estimates for Greeks and Armenians were very similar, it appears that for minority shares the predicted percentage changes in luminosity are noticeably larger for Greeks than for Armenians. Also, the Greek share is statistically more significant with a t-statistic of 3.3 than the Armenian share whose coefficient has a t-statistic of 2.1.
Minorities and Economic Development: Robustness Analyses
In this section we perform several robustness checks to demonstrate that the significant results we presented in the previous section are not simply due to the omission of potential determinants of economic prosperity today. All robustness analyses for the population size regressions in Table 4 are presented in Table 6 . First column in each panel simply replicates the baseline estimates shown in the last column of Table 4 . In subsequent columns, we conduct various robustness checks that will be discussed below.
Access to Railroads and Ports. One concern is that those regions with greater access to railroads or major ports in the past might have developed earlier than others. Clearly, railroad construction is not random. The locations on the railroad network and the exact path it follows depends on economic potential of the waypoints it connects as well as the topography of the region. This is as much true for contemporary rail networks as for the railroads in the past. However, since we do not want to control for any indirect causal effect of minorities on current development, we choose to control for access to railroads as further in the past as possible. Using maps showing the historical rail network around 1910, we construct a railroad dummy that takes a value of 1 when a railroad goes through a given district, and zero otherwise. To measure access to sea trade we use a dummy which takes a value of 1 when a given district lies within within 20 km of a major 19th century port. 19 In column 2, we control for these two variables. is more moderate. Once access to railroads and major ports is controlled for, the estimated change in luminosity in response to an increase in the variable of interest from 10th to the 90th percentile, is reduced only by 7.7 percentage points, i.e., from 58.6 percent down to 50.9 percent (panel B).
The reductions in the coefficients on minority populations reflect the fact that, other things equal, both the Armenians and Greeks (though to a lesser extent) were systematically more likely to live in districts with easier access to railroads and major ports, and this correlation seems to be responsible for part, but not all, of the reduced-form relation between minority size and contemporary development we document in Table 4 . We use two measures to control for exposure to war. One is the number of Ottoman soldiers who died in battle during the WW1. Using information on soldiers' birth province, we assign to each district the corresponding number of casualties in the province containing that district. The second variable is the distance to nearest war front in the Turkish War of Independence. Of course, both of these variables might be endogenous to historical correlates of regional development. For example, soldier participation in WW1 could partly be determined by distance to battle fronts, geographic isolation as well as the capacity of the Ottoman government to recruit soldiers and punish defectors.
Similarly, location of war fronts may depend on several logistical factors including local support, resource availability as well as the strategic priorities of occupying forces. Therefore, estimates on these control variables are likely to be biased.
Column 3 in Table 6 reports the results conditional on our war exposure measures. Distance Table 6 we control for a dummy that takes the value 1 for modern districts that were assigned to the central kaza (merkez kaza) of a given Ottoman sancak (the administrative unit that is one level above kaza) and zero otherwise. 20 The coefficient on this indicator has a positive sign, but it is insignificant except in panel A where Armenian size is the only variable of interest. In all panels, the population size of Armenian and Greeks remains highly significant. The predicted changes in luminosity -reported at the bottom of each panel-in response to higher minority presence are somewhat smaller in percentage terms, but they do not wildly differ from the baseline magnitudes.
Finally, in the last column of Table 6 , all robustness controls are added to the baseline model simultaneously. The main conclusions about minority presence remains unchanged. Both Greek and Armenian population size (conditional on total kaza population) are positive and significant predictors of economic development. Assuming the presence of a causal link, we consider the magnitudes reported in column 6 of panel C as lower bounds for the influence of historical Armenian and Greek presence on regional development. According to these estimates, a region that was at the 90th percentile of the Armenian population size distribution prior to the deportations was, on average, 16 percent richer in year 2000 than an otherwise identical region without any Armenians.
The corresponding difference for Greeks is almost 18 percent.
Robustness checks for minority share regressions. In Table 7 we repeat the same robustness checks using the historical shares of Armenians and Greeks as our variable of interest, and we obtain qualitatively similar results. The positive relationship between the shares of both groups and the level of economic development in 2000 proxied by average luminosity is robust to accounting for (i) access to historical railroad network and to major ports in the 19th century, (ii) casualties in the Ottoman army during WW1 and distance to fronts during the Turkish War of Independence, (iii) the size of the immigrant waves over 1921-1929 and (iv) proximity to central districts of the Ottoman Empire. Controlling for these different groups of variables separately (columns 2 to 5), we see that luminosity has a stronger relation to Greek share than to Armenian share, a pattern that mirrors the baseline results in Table 5 . This gap however becomes negligible, once we add all the robustness controls together (panel C).
In general terms, the main concern about identification is that the positive relation between minority size and economic development might be partly driven by the persistence of initial conditions that are not necessarily a legacy of minority presence, but rather some 'deep' attributes on which there was differential self-selection across ethno-religious groups. In this section, we have attempted to address the most likely problems related to identification. Therefore, the results presented in Table 6 strengthen our confidence in the robustness of the positive legacy of Greeks and Armenians.
Potential Channels of Persistence
Minorities and Inequality in Contemporary Land Holdings
The results from the previous sections support the common wisdom that over many centuries prior to their expulsion, Armenian and Greek communities played an important role in shaping the regional patterns of development in Anatolia. The empirical evidence we have provided so far have revealed positive correlations between population density, urbanization and economic development (measured by luminosity) on the one hand, and the regional concentration of the two largest nonMuslim groups in the Ottoman Empire on the other. We view these findings as potentially reflecting the persistent influence of the higher rate of physical and human capital accumulation among the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Investigation of the possible channels is an ongoing work. This section describes one piece of evidence which we believe can inform this investigation.
After the Armenian deportations and the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange, some of the properties that Armenians and Greeks had to leave behind and their productive assets such as land plots, shops and factories were plundered by the local people or captured by the influential elites of the region. In most part, these properties were confiscated by the state and were eventually sold to the public through auctions, and most of the time, for way below their real value (?). 21
Using a simple model provided in Appendix A, we demonstrate that, under a wide range of reasonable scenarios regarding the post-expulsion transfer of minority assets (like land) among the remaining local population and the potential immigrants that arrive, asset inequality (as measured by Gini index) in a region increases with the share of minorities in the population. If, as predicted by the model, following the deportations and the population exchange, asset inequality was indeed more pronounced in regions with higher historical share of Armenians and Greeks, then we should see the impact of these historical shocks to inequality to persist or perhaps even become magnified over time.
Using district-level information on land holdings of households in 1997 we investigate whether the expulsion of Armenian and Greek minorities had any persistent effect on inequality 21 On 27 September 1915, Talaat Pasha, then the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Finance of the government, drafted a "temporary law" titled "The law about the abandoned properties, debts and credits of the population who were sent elsewhere". With the directive of this law special commissions known as the "Abandoned Property Commissions" (Emval-i Metruke Idare Komisyonları) and the "Liquidation Commissions" (Tasfiye Komisyonu) were established. These commissions were tasked with collecting detailed information about the assets the deportees had to leave behind and assessing their value. Later on, the post-WW1 parliament rejected the deportation and the abandoned properties laws as a violation of the Ottoman constitution. In 1920 the Istanbul Government ruled by Ali Riza ordered by decree that the Armenian properties that were liquidated through war-time regulations should be returned. However, over the period 1922-1925, a series of laws passed first by the Ankara government of the Turkish national independence movement and then by the parliament of the newly established Turkish Republic re-instituted the legal foundation for the liquidation and redistribution of the minority assets (?). in land holdings. 22 In the first column in each panel of Table 8 we estimate the relationship between historical minority shares and the gini index for land holdings by households conditional on our baseline controls. In column (4) we repeat the same analysis using the full specification that includes all of our robustness controls. Both Armenian and Greek presence is a positive and significant predictor of land inequality.
we reestimate our baseline specifications, this time using a Gini index for land holdings of households in a district as our outcome variable. In the subsequent columns, we check the robustness of the baseline findings to additional controls.
Our findings are consistent with the inequality hypothesis. In particular, the results in columns (1) and (4) of panel C suggests that a move from 10th to the 90th percentile in the crossregional distribution of the share of Armenians before the deportations is associated with 2.2 to 2.4 percentage points -or around 0.2 standard deviation-increase in the land Gini coefficient. The corresponding change for the Greek population is 2.8 to 3.1 percentage points -almost 0.3 standard deviation. In all specifications, both of our variables of interest are significant at the 5 percent level or below, and the estimated magnitudes remain highly stable as we add different sets of controls for robustness.
Furthermore, once we account for land gini in 1997 in the luminosity regressions (see columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)), we observe that the coefficient estimates are somewhat smaller. Land gini is strongly correlated with economic activity in year 2000. Taken together these findings are consistent with a possible contribution of minority presence on historical patterns of inequality and the persistence thereof. Yet, it is hard to tell the extent to which our results reflect the causal role of inequality as an intermediating channel rather than inequality induced by the process of economic development.
Minorities and Human Capital Accumulation
Greeks and Armenians had a significant representation in the highly skilled and educated segment of While in the lack of sufficient state investment in education and other social infrastructure in the eastern provinces, a significant majority of Muslims lacked adequate education and skills, Armenian philanthropic agencies and the religious institutions were quite effective in channeling the 22 The ideal way to test the inequality hypothesis would be to use historical data on inequality at the regional level for the aftermath of the expulsions. Such data is unfortunately not available. Systematic records of confiscated properties and how they were distributed among the local Muslims are, to our knowledge, also not available to researchers. In this section, we consider educational attainment as a potentially intermediating variable between historical minority presence and contemporary economic development. There are several reasons to expect that education levels today would be higher in localities that were subject to The results in Table 9 When other robustness controls are added, estimated magnitudes become somewhat smaller but they remain statistically significant for all outcome measures except for the relationship between Greek population share and primary school completion.
In Table 10 we regress average luminosity on minority shares and each of the individual educational attainment measure to see the extent to which the positive minority influence on economic development could be explained by the accumulated human capital. for current education levels, the coefficient on Armenian share, a robust and positive predictor of economic activity at the district level, is noticeably reduced in magnitude and loses its statistical significance. Results are qualitatively similar for Greek share except for literacy. Although our findings in Table 9 and Table 10 do not necessarily reflect a causal effect they nonetheless are consistent with a positive minority legacy on subsequent human capital accumulation and economic development.
Concluding Remarks
This paper offers preliminary evidence suggesting that the centuries-long presence of the two largest non-Muslim minorities of the Ottoman Empire might have significantly shaped the regional patterns of Turkish development. In particular, we find that regions with greater minority population (both in absolute and relative terms) about a century ago exhibit higher population density, higher urbanization and higher night-time light density in 2000.
We offer evidence on two main channels through which Armenian and Greek presence might have shaped the regional outcomes. In particular, we show that current residents of districts with greater exposure to Greek and Armenian presence are more educated today. This result might be a Muslim co-residents in the same localities. Alternatively, it could reflect the persistence of the high return on education driven by the concentration of high value added economic activities pioneered by minorities. Finally we show that land inequality was greater in localities with greater minority concentration. We have argued that this is consistent with an asset transfer story.
The main concern with identification was that the OLS results may not necessarily reflect the persistence of the initial differences in regional development that were caused by the historical settlement patterns of the minorities centuries ago. Instead, they may merely be capturing the persistence of some even deeper initial conditions that had shaped both the settlement patterns of Armenians and Greeks while also contributing independently to current development. In ongoing work we hope to complement our OLS analysis with an instrumental variables analysis.
Appendices
A Minority Share and Post-expulsion Asset Inequality
In this appendix section, we lay out a simple model of asset redistribution from an expelled minority group (which is relatively more wealthy than the majority group) to the remaining population and the potential new immigrants. Our aim is to demonstrate the positive relationship between minority population share and the degree of resulting asset inequality after such redistribution.
Consider two ethno-religious groups j = m, n in a given region. m stands for Muslims and n stands for the non-Muslim minority group. There are two periods (t = 1, 2). t = 1 denotes the period before the expulsion of the minority group. In period 2 the minority group is expelled, Muslim immigrants of size n i 2 settle in the region. In period 1, total population size is given by N 1 , and out of this population n n 1 number of people belong to the non-Muslim group, and the rest of the people constitute the local Muslims.
We denote the shares of each group in the population in period 1 by λ n 1 = n n 1 /N 1 and λ m 1 = 1 − λ n 1 . Total population size in period 2 is given by N 2 = (1 − λ n 1 )N 1 + n i 2 . The value of immovable assets per member in each group j = m, n and each period t = 1, 2 is given by y j t . For convenience we assume that each member of group n has the same quantity of period 1 assets. To keep things simple, we also assume that, in period 2, all members of n are expelled from the region and all of their immovable assets are confiscated. Hence, λ n 2 = 0 and y n 2 = 0. The assets that group n leaves behind is equal to A = n n 1 y n 1 . These are divided among the local Muslims and the new immigrants. We allow the emergence of three potential groups in period 2 which are defined by their asset holdings after the transfer.
Part of the confiscated property is allocated to the Muslim immigrants that arrived after the expulsion. Let us denote the amount of this state transfer to each immigrant by y i 2 . Assuming -for simplicity-that immigrants arrive without any property this transfer is at same time equal to the value of per capita assets of the immigrants. Hence, immigrants constitute one of the three groups in period 2 with an asset per capita of y i 2 and a population share of
The remaining assets are captured by (or auctioned to) local Muslims. Only s e fraction of the local Muslims (e.g. those that have political connections) are able to get a share from A.
Hence, the remainder of minority property after the transfers to immigrants are deducted is equally divided among an influential local elite of size s e (N 1 − n n 1 ). These people constitute the rich local Muslims of period 2 and their share in the population in period 2 is given by
Asset per person in this group is equal to whatever they had in the first period plus the amount they obtain from the division of remaining minority property:
The last group is the local Muslims who could not get anything out of A. Their period 2 assets are equal to their period 1 assets, i.e., y pl 2 = y m 1 . The share of these poor locals in period 2 population is given by
We assume that each group is populated by a continuum of agents. We also assume that the transfer to immigrants is strictly below the assets owned by poor local Muslims, i.e., y i 2 < y pl 2 = y m 1 . Hence, the groups are ranked by their per capita asset holdings as y i 2 < y pl 2 < y rl 2 . Since agents in each group are homogenous with respect to their asset holdings, ranking of individuals within each group is irrelevant. Denote the average asset holding per capita in the region bȳ
Consistent with our historical setting, we assume that minorities were on average wealthier than Muslims, i.e., y n 1 > y m 1 . Hence, average asset holdings per capita in the region is an increasing function of the share of the minorities λ n 1 in period 1. Then, with a bit of algebra one can show that in period 2, the share of the poorest λ fraction of the population owns L 2 (λ) fraction of total assets where
where
L 2 (λ) is the Lorenz curve for asset holdings and it is defined through three linear functions
pl 2 and L rl 2 ) defined over three consecutive regions that correspond to the members of the three groups ranked by their assets. Using the Lorenz curve, we can derive the resulting Gini index as
It is straightforward to show that 
we also have
Combining all the intermediate results with the expression for the Gini index, we can conclude unambiguously that asset inequality increases with the share of minorities:
If the confiscated assets go to a very small fraction of the local Muslims, i.e., as s e → 0, the above conclusion still remains intact. If the minority assets were almost equally divided among the entire local Muslims, i.e., s e → 1, we still have that the Gini index is strictly increasing in the share of minorities as long as there is at least some immigrants coming in after the minorities left and getting some positive transfer out of the confiscated assets.
Furthermore, the asset inequality is decreasing in the fraction of influential local Muslims who manage to receive some share from the confiscated properties, since ∂G ∂s e =
(1 − λ n 1 )
where the inequality follows because the term in the squared brackets is negative due to the fact that total amount of transfers to immigrants cannot exceed the total amount of assets left behind by the minorities. Overlaying all images captured during a calendar year, dropping images where lights are shrouded by cloud or overpowered by the aurora or solar glare (near the poles), and removing ephemeral lights like fires and lightning, an annual composite image of time-stable lights are created. We compute district level luminosity by averaging across all light density pixels that fall within the district boundaries.
Control Variables
Historical Population: In the construction of the historical population measures, we use data on Greek, Armenian and total population reported by the Population Census of the Ottoman
Empire that was conducted during the period 1881-1893. The census measures were reported either at the kaza (Ottoman district) or independent sancak level (when there is no kaza designation).
The variables measure for each modern district in 2000, the absolute size and the share in total population of Armenian and Greek inhabitants of the Ottoman location (kaza or sancak) that was matched with this district. In rare cases when a given modern district is matched with multiple Ottoman kazas, the minority population shares reflect the overall share of these populations in the combination of these kazas. 1881-1893 Ottoman Census was the first census where females were also counted. The census used several ethnic-confessional categories for the Christian population.
The 1893 population data used in this study were published for the first time by (?). Unfortunately, despite its ethnic heterogeneity, all Muslims were lumped into one category. As ? puts it, "These population records issued in 1893 represent the most complete and reliable Ottoman population figures compiled in the nineteenth century. Unlike earlier general population statistics, these gave precise and detailed information on the population of all areas, noting the districts and regions where the census was not completed and providing estimates for the areas not subjected to individual census and registration. The figures in these statistics were considered definitive and reliable and were used as a basis for official statistics concerning the Ottoman population and for subsequent administrative measures". Armenian share is computed as
Greek population share is calculated likewise.
Longitude and Latitude: The latitude and longitude of the district centers in degrees. The values are retrieved via the GPS Visualizer's address locator web application and utilizing the Bing Maps database on location names and coordinates.
Average Elevation and Ruggedness: Average and standard deviation of elevation of a district.
Raw elevation data is downloaded from DIVA-GIS in Grid format. This data is a version of the CGIAR SRTM dataset (originally provided at 3 seconds resolution) aggregated to 30 seconds resolution. Average elevation is simply the mean of the values corresponding to those elevation grids that fall within a given district. Ruggedness is the standard deviation across the same grids.
They are computed using ArcGIS software. The original variable is given in meters. In regressions we rescale them by dividing by 1000.
Lake: A dummy which takes a value of 1 if a lake overlaps (partly or partially) with the territory of the district and 0 otherwise. The shapefile is downloaded from DIVA-GIS in vector format.
The primary source is the Digital Chart of the World. The spatial computations are made using ArcGIS software.
Sea: A dummy which takes a value of 1 if a district is adjacent (touches) a sea body, i.e., 
